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OF AMNESTY, PENDULUMS, AND PEREMPTORY NORMS 
William Schabas* 
For much of the first four decades of its history as an independent State, 
Sierra Leone was in a situation of great turmoil if not full-blown civil war. 
The final years of the century were characterized by a conflict of unspeakable 
brutality. But the country has now been at peace for about twenty years. The 
beginning of this modern period was marked by various initiatives of what is 
usually referred to as transitional justice, devoted to accountability for past 
atrocities and building a strong rule of law framework that would diminish 
the likelihood of recurrence. 
Who can take the credit for this incredible accomplishment? Does Sierra 
Leone furnish proof that an international criminal tribunal targeted at a very 
small number of leading individuals (“those who bear the greatest 
responsibility,”1 to use the words of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone) makes a decisive contribution to permanent peace? Or do some or 
even most of the kudos belong to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
with its broad approach that included analysis of such issues as economic and 
social rights, women’s equality and capital and corporal punishments? Or is 
the real explanation to be found in the terms of the 1999 Lomé Agreement? 
The price it paid for an end to the conflict was a broad amnesty. But maybe 
the amnesty was the key to a peaceful future, diminished only in its totality 
by the dozen or so prosecutions of the Special Court? Or is it all of these 
factors, or none of them? 
The story is surely apocryphal, like most good ones. But it is said that 
when Charles de Gaulle asked Chou Enlai whether he thought the French 
Revolution had been a success, the Chinese premier replied, “It’s too early to 
tell.” Perhaps that is also the case with assessments of the effectiveness of the 
post-conflict mechanisms in Sierra Leone. 
Charles Jalloh, a prodigious scholar and one of Sierra Leone’s most 
brilliant sons, has produced this thoughtful volume on the legacy of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Of course, it also deals with aspects of the 
work of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, as both of these were considered 
in important judgments of the Special Court. 
 
* Professor of International Law, Middlesex University London and Professor of International 
Criminal Law and Human Rights, Leiden University. 
1 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. 
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In the chapter he devotes to the amnesty issue, Professor Jalloh reflects 
on some of the weaknesses in the Court’s ruling. It has often seemed to me 
that amnesty is a bit like a pendulum. At one end of the cycle is the notorious 
provision in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 
1977, and pretty much sanctifying the practice of amnesty at the close of non-
international armed conflicts. In the years that followed, after some quite 
repulsive “self-amnesties” were granted in Latin America, the pendulum 
began to swing. The judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court 
was probably at the other extreme, at the opposite end of the cycle. 
The Special Court’s judgment used the sort of ambiguous language that 
seems to work when firm evidence doesn’t exist. Rather than say there is a 
rule prohibiting amnesty, it said that one was “crystallizing.” My favorite is 
another one of its formulations, cited at page 300 of Professor Jalloh’s book, 
whereby the Appeals Chamber speaks of amnesty being “contrary to the 
direction in which customary international law is developing.”2 Politicians 
may be animated by the direction of travel, but courts? Do they really take 
decisions based on intuition about what law may become? 
The problem, of course, is that some things never do crystallize. This is 
as true of chemistry as it is of international law. And pendulums swing in 
both directions. The amnesty pendulum has not continued to move in the 
direction that the Special Court anticipated. Rather, it seems to be returning 
to equilibrium. 
In 2012, in the El Mozote case, a majority of judges of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights subscribed to the concurring opinion of 
Judge Diego Garcia-Sayán. He took a nuanced approach to transitional 
justice, one where criminal prosecution might be stayed in favor of other 
mechanisms, and where amnesty might be acceptable to the extent that it 
facilitated an end to armed conflict.3 In 2018, the Special Rapporteur on 
crimes against humanity of the International Law Commission, of which 
Charles Jalloh is a distinguished member, produced a balanced analysis of 
the amnesty issue that argued against a rule of outright prohibition. Most 
recently, in March 2020, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Court was somewhat dismissive of a Pre-Trial Chamber ruling on amnesty 
that had cited, amongst other authorities, the ruling of the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone. The Appeals Chamber made a point of characterizing the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s pronouncement as obiter dictum and concluded: “For 
present purposes, it suffices to say only that international law is still in the 
 
2 CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 300 
(2020) (quoting Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCLS-2004-15-AR72 (E), SCSL-2004–16-AR72(E), 
Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty ¶ 84 (Mar. 13, 2004)).  
3 Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador, Judgment (Merits, reparations, and 
costs) of 25 October 2012, Series C, No. 252, Concurring Opinion of Judge Diego Garcia-Sayán, ¶ 9. 
14 - SCHABAS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2021  12:23 PM 
2021] Of Amnesty, Pendulums, and Peremptory Norms 85 
developmental stage on the question of acceptability of amnesties.”4 Not 
crystallizing. And with no claim to know the direction of travel. 
Professor Jalloh has quite astutely focused on the reference to jus cogens 
in the amnesty decision. The Appeals Chamber made the highly original 
claim that “the obligation to protect human dignity is a peremptory norm and 
has assumed the nature of obligation erga omnes.”5 Within the International 
Law Commission, Professor Jalloh made several very constructive proposals 
to the shortlist of peremptory norms that it prepared and published in its 2019 
report. For example, he drew attention to the importance of gender 
discrimination, although it seems more conservative members prevailed, and 
it did not make the final cut. Nowhere did he, or for that matter any other 
member, suggest that “the obligation to protect human dignity” should be 
included. It is a notion so vague as to render meaningless the whole concept 
of jus cogens norms. The Appeals Chamber’s far-fetched assertion was 
designed to sweep away everything in its path, treating peremptory norms 
like customary law on steroids. As Professor Jalloh wisely notes, much of the 
Court’s discussion including the gratuitous reference to jus cogens “was 
unnecessary as it seems doubtful that current state practice, which admittedly 
seems to be changing, supports an expansive or absolutist positions on 
conditional or qualified amnesties.”6 
 
 
4 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi ICC-01/11-01/11 ¶ 91, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the “Admissibility Challenge 
by Dr. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi pursuant to Articles 17(1)(c), 19 and 20(3) of the Rome Statute”’ of 5 April 
2019, 9 March 2020. 
5 JALLOH, supra note 2, at 289.  
6 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCLS-2004-15-AR72 (E), SCSL-2004–16-AR72(E), 
Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty ¶ 71 (Mar. 13, 2004)).  
